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Naturphilosophie redivivus:  
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AbstrAct: Bruno latour’s work, today becoming increasingly influential in philosophical circles, 
represents a clear challenge to prevailing philosophical accounts of the relation between human 
subjectivity and the natural world. the ‘political ecology’ which latour sets out in works such 
as We Have Never Been Modern (1991) and more extensively in The Politics of  Nature (1999) is a call 
to arms to rethink concepts of nature taken for granted ever since the time of Kant. yet despite 
its apparent novelty, and despite its apparent break with post-Kantian continental philosophy, 
latour’s thinking often unwittingly reworks philosophical moves made within that tradition, 
even during Kant’s lifetime, specifically in the movement known as Naturphilosophie. Bringing to 
light the elective affinities between latour’s ideas and those of Naturphilosophie, this article suggests 
that the former unconsciously rehearses key tenets of the latter, in particular the claims made 
by schelling against Kant. Moreover, latour will be seen to succumb to the problems which a 
subsequent developer of Naturphilosophie—hegel—would identify in schelling’s own conception 
of nature. Finally, whilst latour offers an apparently compelling alternative to notions of subject 
and object, free-will and mechanism, along with the conceptual separation of humans from the 
natural world, his thought often fails to achieve the genuine critique that would be adequate to 
comprehending these oppositions, and to explaining the ecological crisis in which both humans 
and nonhumans are caught up. 
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hegel iN Kyoto
in the preface to his Philosophy of  Right hegel famously urges against those who see 
philosophy’s task as giving instruction as to how the world ought to be that, on the 
contrary, philosophy ‘always comes on the scene too late to give it’.1 hegel’s equally 
famous image of the owl of Minerva which takes flight only at dusk was to capture the 
idea of a wisdom which is belated, but perhaps no less valuable for all that. as symbol 
it would describe well the predicament of environmental philosophy today, in an age in 
which, if the increasing number of scientific reports are true, humans may have effected 
their natural habitat in ways that have now run destructively out of human control. 
in such a situation philosophy would be both necessary—perhaps a pascalian wager 
     1. g.W.F. hegel, Philosophy of  Right, trans. t. M. Knox, oxford, oxford university press, 1967, pp. 11-12.
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on its own remedial influence—but also necessarily modest in its aim to change what 
hegel termed, with some irony, ‘the world’s course’. such a view of philosophy is worth 
bearing in mind when reading Bruno latour’s 2001 work Politiques de la Nature, a book 
which can with some justification be seen as the most radical contribution yet to that 
growing genre of philosophy which tries to comprehend and respond critically to the 
present ecological crisis. What is significant in latour’s book, beyond the challenge it 
throws down to undertake a ‘destruction of the idea of nature’2 to rival the great attempts 
at philosophical ‘destruction’ of the twentieth century, is how far it embodies, despite its 
explicit rejection of the dialectical tradition hegel launched, something of the hegelian 
picture of philosophy as the retrospective grasping of historical actuality in thought. this 
is visible not least in the philosophical weight latour gives to events which are seen—not 
in so many words—as world-historical, in particular the event which took place in Kyoto in 
1997 when scientists, politicians and political activists came together to discuss the state 
of the planet in ways which, if latour is right, unwittingly invalidated a millennia-old 
opposition between society and nature. this ‘event’, which looms large at many points in 
latour’s writing, forces on us, so he argues, a radical rethinking of previous assumptions 
about the separateness of nature from society, of the distinction between scientific truth 
and public doxa, and lends credence to the idea that matters of fact should be replaced 
by ‘matters of concern’, that nonhuman nature be recognized just like humans as actor 
and agent, and that a new ‘collective’ be ‘convoked’ to replace an age-old dualistic 
metaphysics. if the world-spirit was not quite marching through the Kyoto conference 
halls, the event was for latour no less momentous. 
latour, of course, would reject any explicit association with the hegelian ideas just 
set out. his writing sits consciously within a post-war French philosophical tradition 
which has long abandoned a dialectical approach and sought instead a different vo-
cabulary in which to express its concerns. yet latour also breaks stylistically with much 
post-war French thought, borrowing the rigour of analytic philosophy to treat familiar 
themes, particularly the questioning of Western conceptual dualisms, with unfamiliar 
clarity. Politics of  Nature, continuing the work of his earlier We Have Never Been Modern, is 
also admirably interdisciplinary, informed not only by philosophy but by latour’s own 
research in the social study of natural science and by his personal involvement in the 
ecology movement. yet latour is also a virulent critic of existing ecological politics, a 
politics he feels has been waylaid by erroneous philosophical assumptions about society 
and nature, and it is against these assumptions that the book is primarily directed. it is 
true that as a work of philosophy, noticeably few philosophers or their texts are dealt 
with by name, but one should not overlook the clear philosophical ramifications of a 
work whose groundbreaking character a growing number of readers of latour—nota-
bly adherents of so-called ‘object-oriented philosophy’,3 even when they take his work in 
a direction other than his intentions—have recognized. 
     2. Bruno latour, Politics of  Nature, trans. catherine porter, cambridge, Ma & london, harvard univer-
sity press, 2004, p. 25 (henceforth cited as pN). 
     3. see graham harman, Prince of  Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics, Melbourne, re.press, 2009.
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if the world is indeed set on a self-destructive course then we can perhaps understand 
latour’s defining stylistic characteristic in Politiques de la Nature—an impatience with a tra-
dition of philosophical concepts which bar the way to a more searching conception than 
‘nature’ allowed, one that would do justice to the co-implication of humans and nonhu-
mans in the crisis and in any necessary response to it. specifically, latour’s targets—and 
here the argument of We Have Never Been Modern is applied and updated—are all those 
philosophies which assumed a clear boundary between politics or society and nature 
or science; these now figure as obstacles to grasping processes which already cut across 
those boundaries, both the destructive processes registered as ecological crisis and in re-
medial actions which—as in Kyoto—aim to avert the worst. the destruction of the ‘idea’ 
of nature is to remedy nature’s actual destruction, a set of threats which can no longer be 
said to come from some putative ‘outside’. a platonic myth of the cave, for instance, to 
name one of latour’s recurrent targets, is said to lie behind an enduring assumption that 
we can contrast the doxa of values with the truth of science, or divide those who ‘debate 
endlessly’ (politicians) from those who ‘let the facts speak for themselves’ (scientists). such 
assumptions are invalidated by the events of which Kyoto is emblematic. there, where 
science became unavoidably politicized, subject to public opinion and to vested inter-
ests, for the very reason that the political—the realm of human values and opinions—
began to concern itself with the nonhuman and to mobilize ‘matters of fact’ in a contest 
of values, we are forced, so latour argues, to rethink both our conception of the natural 
world and the natural science by whose methods it was hitherto predominantly known. 
the view of politics as an exclusively human affair, latour suggests, ‘leaves nature to 
the scientists’, in a world where that very nature is now of universal political concern and 
where expertise must no longer be the sole preserve of specialists or an elite. however, 
latour is at pains to distinguish his argument from one previous attempt to overcome the 
divide between science and politics, namely the sociological theory of ‘the social construc-
tion of nature’ (pN 32). Whilst ‘constructivists’ captured their object’s historical and geo-
graphical variability they forbade anything substantial being said about external reality. 
as latour puts, it, we were thereby restricted to the cave, to the ‘prison of society’. on the 
contrary, he argues, science is still a highly valid pursuit, because it operates at a level of 
proximity to the natural world which is unrealistic for the non-specialist. the scientist will 
always remain a highly useful ‘representative’ of the nonhuman realm, particularly today, 
but we can and should, latour suggests, subject science’s claim to a faithful representation 
of nature to the same criticism historically leveled at our political representatives. 
latour’s conscious aim is not just to breach the boundary between the social and 
the natural-scientific with occasional ‘forays’ across the lines that essentially ‘leave the 
boundary intact’ but, as he puts it, to blur the distinction between nature and society 
durably, so that ‘we shall never have to go back to two distinct sets, with nature on one 
side and the representations that humans make of it on the other.’ (pN 36) once we do 
this, once we ‘take nature away’, we then ‘have no more ‘others,’ no more ‘us’…. once 
we have exited from the great diorama of ‘nature in general,’ we are left with the banal-
ity of multiple associations of humans and nonhumans waiting for their unity to be pro-
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vided by work carried out by the collective’ (pN 46), a collective whose membership is 
not predetermined but is deliberately left open to new claimants. 
For the moment, ‘nature’ still has the resonance that ‘man’ had twenty or forty years 
ago, as the unchallengeable, blinding, universal category against the background 
of which ‘culture’ stands out clearly and distinctly, eternally particular. ‘Nature’ is 
thus an unmarked category, while ‘culture’ is marked. Now, however, through a 
movement just as vast in scope, political ecology proposes to do for nature what 
feminism undertook to do and is still doing for man: wipe out the ancient self-
evidence with which it was taken a bit too hastily as if it were all there is (pN 49). 
Membership of this new ‘marked’ collective is based on capacities which cut across 
the former two ‘houses’, firstly an expanded notion of speech—for latour even non-
humans and inanimate things can be said to speak (though they, like humans, typically 
do so through representatives—scientists—who are their ‘speech prostheses’ [pN 67]), 
and secondly by replacing a prejudice that only humans count as actors or agents with 
a focus on that capacity non-humans and humans share to have effects. What has effects 
latour names an ‘actant’, a term now increasingly taken up by the social sciences and, 
germinally, by philosophers. the word, chosen to avoid ‘any traces of anthropomorphism’ 
names anything or anyone which ‘modifies’ other actors, a modification which itself can 
be measured ‘by some experimental protocol’ (pN 75). like membership of the new 
collective, who or what might count as actant is to be decided tentatively, experimentally, 
since their ‘potential is still unknown’ (pN 82). 
Where a glacier or a rainforest, a microbe or a hurricane is just as much an actor as 
is a human, the readiness of this philosophy to encounter the current crisis is clearly a 
virtue, allowing a useful suspension of judgment on who or what may now be a ‘matter 
of concern’. those ‘hybrid’ entities which will now concern us are precisely those which 
under the previous ‘constitution’ could not be adequately taken into account, and which 
threaten perpetually to return, like the Freudian repressed, until such time as they are 
given due consideration.
When a member of the old constitution looked outside, she was looking upon a 
nature made up of objects indifferent to her passions, to which she had to submit 
or from which she had to tear herself away. When [today] we look outside, we 
see a whole still to be composed, made up of excluded entities (humans and 
nonhumans) in whom we have…[previously] decided not to be interested, and of 
appellants (humans and nonhumans) who [now] demand more or less noisily to be 
part of our republic. there is nothing left of the old metaphysics of nature, nothing 
left of the old allegory of the cave, although everything that matters to public 
life remains: reality—the nonhumans and their cohorts; externality—produced 
according to the rules and no longer surreptitiously; unity—the progressive unity 
of the collective in the process of exploration (pN 127).
as this quote suggests, within latour’s wider wholistic and collectivizing project special 
criticism is reserved for the way the concepts of subject and object became aligned 
with the human and nonhuman respectively to form a philosophical dualism which 
exceeded philosophy itself, becoming an assumption of political life and an obstacle 
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to understanding our current predicament (pN 90). particular ire is reserved in this 
connection for the writings of French philosopher luc Ferry, whose 1995 work The New 
Ecological Order had defended the differences between human and nonhuman, subject 
and object against attempts to deconstruct them. For latour, Ferry overlooks the 
very circularity of the definitions of subject and object, the one defined as self-causing 
freedom, as resistance to mere thinghood, the other as any thing caused and acted 
upon, lacking free will. the counterposed but mutually reinforcing concepts of subject 
and object ensured, so latour argues, the integrity of the human, moral realm at the 
cost of cutting us off conceptually from our animality and from the world itself. 
latour admits there were attempts to overcome rather than merely recapitulate the 
philosophical dualism of subject and object, most notably in ‘dialectics’, but the dialecti-
cal tradition too comes in for strong criticism in this, as in previous books. those phi-
losophies, he says, which spoke of subject and object’s possible ‘reconciliation’ ‘[t]hreat-
ened public life with a promise of salvation worse than the evil against which it offers 
protection’ (pN 40). hegel’s philosophy in particular, when it took the contradictions of 
Kantian thought to express a discordant actuality, amounted to ‘extending the artifacts 
of modernist thought to the world itself. No anthropomorphism is more complete than 
the one that makes the universe share in the category errors of a few philosophers of the 
sciences’ (pN 263n.23). political ecology, in stark contrast, is said to resist the anthropo-
morphism of dialectics by prying apart ‘multiplicity and what collects multiplicity in a 
single unified whole’. it aims through unprejudiced ‘articulation’ of ‘propositions’, that 
is, consideration of claims to membership of the collective, to establish a more inclusive 
cosmos than the concepts of subject and object allowed, grounded as they are in con-
frontational and hierarchical assumptions. 
there is, then, a path other than idealism that we can follow to leave nature 
behind, a path other than subjects that we can take to leave objects behind, a 
path other than dialectics that was supposed to enable us to ‘get beyond’ the 
contradiction between subject and object. (pN 40)
the NeW iNdiFFereNz
the path which latour wants to take is one he emphasizes will be different to that 
taken by modernity in its philosophical self-understanding. Modern philosophy, or 
‘modernism’, is said to be responsible for the dualistic, humanistic ‘constitution’ which is 
a barrier to political ecology;4 it is a tradition latour aims avowedly to ‘disinvent’ (pN 
193). Backtracking slightly from this claim in a recent speech, latour seems briefly to 
recognize how difficult it would be to disentangle oneself from a tradition whose mark 
has been left even on its harshest critics, how unlikely is the project of writing philosophy 
de novo. he now notes the influence on his own thinking of alfred North Whitehead and 
William James, neglected luminaries of an ‘unmodern’ counter-tradition.5 
     4. latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. catherine porter, london, harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, ch. 2.
     5. latour, ‘coming out as a philosopher’ (acceptance speech for the siegfried unseld prize, 28.9.08), 
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yet here, in latour’s lingering opposition to modern philosophy and in his attempt to 
write outside of its thematics, to revive ‘unmodern’ philosophies, we begin to see a blind 
spot in his thinking. latour has overlooked how far that same modern tradition even 
at its inception, was itself something of a ‘hybrid’, incorporating many of the insights of 
the ‘unmoderns’. in particular latour overlooks how far during the late 1700s spinoza’s 
highly unmodern monism was re-worked within modern philosophy in ways which ac-
tually anticipate his own concerns. to be more specific, latour’s repeated questioning 
of the duality of man and nature as exemplified in the opposition of subject and object, 
along with his attempt to find a wholistic and integral metaphysics beyond these dualities, 
moves along paths already well-trodden by the early german romantics (Frühromantiker) 
of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. precedents for latour’s line of thought are particu-
larly apparent in the arguments of the young schelling, who used spinoza to critique the 
dualisms left by Kantian philosophy. it is not difficult to detect, though latour and his 
followers have yet to explore them, the many parallels between his work and that of the 
schelling of the period 1797-1806. What can be seen as latour’s unavowed repetition of 
schellingian ideas will prove crucial because it impacts on the plausibility of some of his 
key arguments, arguments which reflect the great appeal but also the key weaknesses of 
schelling’s Naturphilosophie, and it is to these we must now turn.
latour can be seen, like schelling and his early romantic contemporaries, to 
lament a philosophy of ‘reflection’ which separates phenomena from their underlying 
unity, ordering and hierarchically categorizing them. For schelling, no ‘rift’ should be 
established between anthropos and cosmos; ‘contact and reciprocal action must be pos-
sible between the two’.6 to overcome this rift it would be necessary, schelling argued, to 
find a position which was neither idealist nor realist but would challenge the twin doxas 
of nature as real external object and as merely spun out of the subject’s representations. 
For schelling, so is it for latour, for whom the belief that there are only two such phil-
osophical positions ‘is in effect the essential source of the power that is symbolized by 
the myth of the cave and that political ecology must now secularize’ (pN 34).7 the dis-
cipline of Naturphilosophie proposed by schelling aimed not simply to apply philosophy 
to natural science but instead urged philosophy to move from ‘intelligence’ to ‘nature’, 
just as natural science must move from ‘nature to intelligence’ and the two meet in the 
middle,8 an idea also endorsed by latour. For neither thinker would the new philosophy 
thereby created invalidate science per se. crucially, latour shares schelling’s belief that 
the opposition of subject and object, and thereby of humans to nature, is to be over-
come through a fundamental shift of  perspective from which one becomes able, as it were, 
to see the boundary between humans and cosmos from either side, recognize the con-
stitution of that boundary, and so overcome it. to this end the early schelling thought 
http://www.bruno-latour.fr/articles/article/114-unseld-preis.pdf, p. 6. 
     6. F.W.J. schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of  Nature, trans. e. harris and p. heath, cambridge university 
press, 1988, pp. 10-11.
     7. For this reason i find the direction harman takes latour’s work, into unabashed realism, to be some-
what one-sided.
     8. schelling, System of  Transcendental Idealism, trans. p. heath, university of virginia press, 1978, p. 6.
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a new kind of intuition necessary, one that dissolves rather than refutes the dichotomies 
left by Kantian idealism, particularly subject and object.9 though nothing as systematic 
as the attempt to work out a schellingian ‘intellectual intuition’ to ground this idea is to 
be found in latour, the two nevertheless unite in the object of their criticism and the 
means of overcoming it. 
For schelling, as for the other Frühromantiker, the relationship of subject to object in 
consciousness was grounded at a deeper level in a whole of which subject and object 
were mere parts.10 at the time of their early collaboration, this idea was shared by 
schelling and hegel, the latter also under the sway of romanticism. Both developed a 
concept of ‘life’ (das Leben), which would mediate between the subjective and objective, 
subject and object now construed as merely different degrees of complexity of a single 
vital force, by turns internalised and externalised.11 Nature for schelling is an ‘immature 
intelligence’ or what hegel calls a ‘petrified intelligence’,12 on a continuum rather than 
across a divide from the human mind (Geist), a mind now interpreted as life sufficiently 
evolved to become an object to itself. the antinomies of Kantian thought are reunited 
through the thought of a single substance in which, as schelling puts it, ‘spirit is invisible 
nature, and nature is visible spirit’.13
two more of the many parallels between latour and schelling can be mentioned, 
since both thinkers attempt to sidestep the (Kantian) dualism of free will versus mecha-
nism, in latour’s case via the notion of ‘actants’ who exhibit ‘a range of uncertainties 
going from necessity to freedom’ (pN 82), in schelling’s case via an account of nature 
as a ‘productivity’ of which humans and nature embody only different levels of organi-
zation. activity—a recent translator of schelling’s Outline of  a System of  the Philosophy 
of  Nature even renders Aktion as ‘actants’—becomes for both thinkers definitive of all 
beings. Finally, both thinkers see their accounts of this monistically conceived cosmos as 
constitutionally incomplete, reliant on ‘experiment’ for validation, an experimentation 
itself understood to be an infinite task.14
What can be taken from these undoubted similarities? Not simply that latour with 
the best of intentions seems to be making philosophical moves that have been made 
before. this would be an interesting oversight but not necessarily a flaw, were it not that 
moving within the orbit of schellingian Naturphilosophie ignores the subsequent fate of 
that discipline, particularly in the hands of hegel, who broke with his one-time collabo-
rator, schelling, and developed a more self-critical version of the philosophy of nature. 
     9. schelling, ‘philosophical letters on dogmatism and criticism’, in The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: 
Four Early Essays (1794-96), trans. F. Marti, london, associated university presses, 1980, p. 175.
     10. Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of  Early German Romanticism, trans. elizabeth Millán-zai-
bert, albany, suNy press, 2004, pp. 116-117; Frederick Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of  Early 
German Romanticism, cambridge, Ma & london, harvard university press, 2006, pp. 138-9.
     11. Beiser, ‘hegel and Naturphilosophie’, Studies in History and Philosophy of  Science, vol. 34, no. 1, 2003, p. 
141.
     12. alison stone, Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s Philosophy, albany, suNy press, 2005.
     13. schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of  Nature, p. 42
     14. schelling, First Outline of  a System of  the Philosophy of  Nature, trans. K.r. peterson, albany, suNy press, 
2004, p. 199; latour, pN 196.
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When this later development and self-critique of Naturphilosophie in hegel’s work is fle-
shed out it will become clearer why latour’s broadly schellingian approach may not 
have solved the problems it addresses in the way he thinks it has, and that this has rami-
fications for the remedial programme latour sets out as ‘political ecology’.
hegel’s philosophy can be seen to undertake an immanent criticism of romantic 
Naturphilosophie which exposes the inadequate treatment of the Kantian dualisms in 
schelling’s attempt to reunite anthropos and cosmos. For hegel, schelling’s Naturphiloso-
phie still contained an incomplete, one-sided account of the relation between humans 
and the nonhuman world, and he began searching for a more sophisticated explana-
tion of what separates humans from nature. this search is to be found not only in he-
gel’s 1830 work The Philosophy of  Nature (a work which, incidentally, shows hegel in no 
way ‘left nature to the scientists’), but already in his so-called Systementwürfe of 1803-6 
where ‘media’ (Mittel) such as language, labour and the tool are analyzed as bridges be-
tween subject and object, mind and world (an analysis which, incidentally, also under-
mines latour’s charge that modern philosophy always assumed a ‘prison-house’ model 
of society).15 at the same time, hegel saw something his colleague schelling had not, 
that these ‘media’ were themselves mediated by historical actualities which alter their 
character and complicate the simple picture of a harmoniously bridged divide. our re-
lation to the object via media such as work has, with the rise of societies premised on 
an advanced division of labour, become mechanical, machine-like and the subject has 
become alienated from the object he or she works upon in the same movement as that 
object becomes deadened, living nature become lifeless ‘thing’. labour and the use of 
tools become what hegel in the 1803/4 Systementwurf calls ‘the putting of the [object] to 
death, ripping it out of its living context’, a subjugation of the natural world for which 
humans pay a high price: ‘what [man] gains from nature, the more he subdues it, the 
lower he sinks himself ’.16
this analysis would be deepened a few years later in the Phenomenology of  Spirit, 
where the development of human alienation from nature is explained via an account of 
intra-human hierarchy. the Phenomenology of  Spirit, a work which, amongst its many phil-
osophical, social and political concerns, shows hegel further distancing himself from 
the schellingian outlook, takes aim in particular at schelling’s version of the critique of 
subject and object in the System of  Transcendental Idealism: there the story was told of an 
absolute i reconstructing the history of its coming to self-consciousness, a growth said 
by schelling to begin in nature, out of which man evolves. in hegel’s Phenomenology this 
account of self-consciousness’s origin is transplanted from the sphere of natural history 
into the realm of human history, with implications it is hard to overestimate.
hegel places the birth of human self-consciousness not simply within natural his-
tory but at the singular moment of the first socio-historical act, the curious but deeply 
resonant story of a fight to the death between two not-yet-human beings, a fight which 
     15. hegel, System of  Ethical Life and First Philosophy of  Spirit, trans. h.s. harris & t.M. Knox, albany, suNy 
press, 1979, pp. 222-31.
     16. hegel, System of  Ethical Life, p. 247.
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becomes inadvertently a struggle in which the categories of subjectivity and freedom are 
born. hegel transforms Naturphilosophie in the Phenomenology by entertaining the idea that 
the schellingian self-consciousness which has emerged out of natural existence does so as 
self-divided, as scarred by human social hierarchy, a hierarchy which in turn will structure 
humans’ interaction with nature. in the famous ‘master-slave dialectic’, the slave, the one 
who has submitted in the fight to the death, is put to work on nature in order to produce 
‘things’ for the master, and in doing so, hegel tells us, relates differently to nature than 
does the one who has subjugated him.17 hegel suggests that the way nature becomes 
mere ‘thing’ cannot be understood outside of a relation of mastery and servitude which 
now mediates humanity’s typical contact with nature. at the same time as they become 
historical and not just natural actors, hegel says, neither the newborn master nor slave 
can forget their embodied, animal side, present to them most clearly in the reality of 
death glimpsed in their struggle.18 humans, the animal for whom freedom and subjec-
tivity have become issues (and in this movement distinguished themselves from other 
animals), are both natural and unnatural: they never lose their natural finitude and em-
bodiment but this natural element is transformed by the very society born in the moment 
of humans’ recognition of the value of their natural life. hegel is telling us that earthly 
‘nature’ cannot be understood in abstraction from its apparent antithesis, ‘history’, which 
mediates the former but also separates itself from it in actuality as well as in thought. the 
difference as well as the identity between subject and object, nature and society, human ‘in-
dependence’ as well as ‘dependence’ (to give the correct title of the master-slave dialectic) must 
be thought together if they are to be understood. one cannot understand humanity’s re-
lation to, and alienation from, the natural world without an account of human inequality 
and the alienation of humans from each other, a situation which, the Phenomenology will 
go on to show, has characterized our entire history hitherto.19  
recognizing hegel’s critique of schelling’s Naturphilosophie in these early works also 
sheds light on the later Encyclopedia Philosophy of  Nature where hegel laments a tendency 
amongst his contemporaries to posit an almost prelapsarian vision of innocence wherein 
spirit and Nature are theoretically conjoined, a unity we are to perceive through an ‘in-
tuition’ (Anschauung). on the contrary, argues hegel, ‘this unity of intelligence and intui-
tion, of the inwardness of spirit and its relation to externality, must be not the beginning, 
but the goal, not an immediate, but a resultant unity’.20 Man, hegel says, ‘must have 
gone through the labour and activity of thought in order to become what he is, having 
overcome this separation between himself and Nature. the immediate unity is thus 
     17. hegel, Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. a.v. Miller, oxford, oxford university press, 1977, pp. 115-16.
     18. hegel, Phenomenology of  Spirit, p. 115.
     19. the tradition which developed out of hegelian philosophy would on rare but intriguing occasions 
appreciate this insight, recognizing that humans’ exploitative relation to nature needs to explained in terms 
of intra-human hierarchies and socio-economic imperatives, an insight visible in the work of engels, Max 
horkheimer and in the last essays written by Marcuse. cf. adrian Wilding, ‘ideas for a critical theory of 
Nature’, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, vol. 19 no. 4, 2008
     20. hegel , Encyclopedia of  the Philosophical Sciences: Philosophy of  Nature, trans. a. v. Miller, oxford, oxford 
university press, 1970, pp. 7-8.
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only an abstract, implicit truth, not the actual truth’.21 the unity of humans with nature, 
or better, a richer unity understood as ‘reconciliation’ (Versöhnung), having learned from, 
become educated by, the real experience of diremption, having ‘made good again the 
loss’,22 is a task to be achieved rather than a first principle. to see it as a first principle, as 
an existent unity capable of being intuited, is to preempt the unprecedented. 
in this light it can now be seen how latour has succumbed to a problem hegel al-
ready saw in schelling, namely the positing of a principle of indifference between nature 
and humanity. For hegel indifference tells only half the story: whilst it is undeniable that 
many human activities bridge the apparent divide between us and the rest of nature, it 
is equally undeniable that a separation or alienation from the rest of nature has devel-
oped in tandem with the sophistication of those activities. squaring both of these in-
sights suggests a richer conception is needed,  a conception of the unity-in-difference (a 
real historical difference, an alienation) of nature and human Geist, and it was to this that 
hegel turned his attention. his findings had one further important implication. if the 
real historical separation of humans from the rest of nature is to be mitigated (and hegel 
clearly thought mitigation rather than annulment of this divide was our best hope) it will 
require more than simply a changed worldview. Not least because, as the Phenomenology 
and later Philosophy of  Right would flesh out, subject and object have become sedimented 
and actualized in history, the subject by positive law’s production of the ‘person’, the 
object by abstract labour which made it into a lifeless, insignificant thing. No simple 
intellectual intuition, no simple different way of thinking is enough to overcome such 
actualities. instead an unfolding of how this divided history has come to be, and come 
to structure our thinking, would be needed to make clear the preconditions for its prac-
tical overcoming. 
For hegel both object and subject are no mere fictions for which we could substi-
tute a latourian concept of ‘hybrids’; they are actual products of modern societies and 
determinants of the individual under modern conditions of production and exchange. 
under the heading of Rechtsphilosophie hegel would analyze the way law comes to me-
diate the boundary between humans and nature and create in modern societies a sup-
position of free will via the notion of human legal culpability.23 subjectivity is not just 
an erroneous way of thinking about humans, a category mistake, as latour implies, but 
what modern law has made of the individual, ‘persons’ legally and by implication mor-
ally responsible for their actions, capable of reflection, and of giving reasons for those 
actions. law comes to determine the modern bourgeois subject through the attribution 
of free will, even when that freedom remains merely formal, contradicted by a wider 
social unfreedom to which it acts as court of appeal. put another way, the subject is both 
real and ideal, it names a condition of self-determination in relation to a world of ob-
jects and other subjects which is only contradictorily and not-yet adequately realized in 
modern societies. in dialectical terms, the subject does not go into its concept without 
     21. hegel, Philosophy of  Nature, p. 9
     22. hegel, Philosophy of  Nature, p. 444.
     23. hegel, Philosophy of  Right, pp. 75-84.
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remainder, a remainder that serves a critical function in relation to existing hierarchies 
and unfreedoms even when it is stamped by that same hierarchical, unfree society. 
on the side of the object too, latour’s abstract negation of the subject-object dual-
ism will overlook the unavoidable representation present in that very scientific knowl-
edge he wants to hold on to. the object (Gegenstand), as conceived classically in german 
idealism, intended nothing more than that phenomena already appear to us synthe-
sised by our ideas and forms of understanding yet as something different from ourselves, 
standing outside or ‘over against’ us. For hegel the object’s apparent otherness is seen to 
be exacerbated by the abstract labour which becomes generalized in modern societies 
and through which so many natural phenomena become mere artifice; we become dis-
tanced in reality not just in thought from the natural stuff laboured upon. at the same 
time, for the tradition which invented the language of subject and object there was 
never the simple dualism ascribed to it today; the post-Kantians, hegel particularly, 
always emphasised subject and object’s mutual mediation; they also acknowledged that 
humans could be both subject and object at different times and in different respects. yet 
hegel also recognized how far human social relations decisively mediated our relation 
to nature, altered and distorted the bridges or ‘media’ which exist between the two. For 
latour ‘mediation’ is just a gloss on a still entrenched dualism,24 but without this very 
concept of mediation we are unable to think identity, difference and relation in any 
complex, interdependent way, the very interdependence ecology requires. 
latour’s attempt to bring together the human and nonhuman in ‘assemblages’ over-
looks this very real difficulty that humans are both separated from nature through the 
division of labour, and that human subjectivity implies a freedom and self-determina-
tion that is not exhausted by the bare ‘having effects’ that defines actants, even when 
their freedom exists in contradicted form. yet in the shift away from the will and ration-
ality onto mere effects, the autonomy contradicted in modernity is ignored rather than 
rescued from its perverted forms, and social heteronomy is left unchallenged and un-
challengeable. the differences between humans and nonhumans which are reproduced 
every day in modern societies’ interactions with nature, and which are of no less impor-
tance to philosophy and to politics than the homologies, become invisible, the prover-
bial night in which all cats look grey. 
latour tries to walk a path ‘beyond subject and object other than by dialectics’ (pN 
40) but this path, as can now be seen, easily becomes an impasse. had he not so hastily 
discarded the moderns—and the dialectical tradition in particular—he might have found 
ways round the many problems political ecology encounters. Far from being the unhelp-
ful relic latour makes it out to be, a dialectical way of thinking arguably sheds much light 
on the paradox of our contemporary societies—at odds with nature even when they rest 
upon natural foundations, societies which, as one famous dialectician put it, produce a 
disastrous ‘rift’ between humans and nature which threatens the ‘metabolic’ balance of 
both.25 it is perhaps only a dialectical imagination which allows one to comprehend the 
     24. latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 57.
     25. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3, trans. d. Fernbach, harmondsworth, penguin, 1976, p. 949; John Bellamy 
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mediation of social subject and environment at the same time as their destructive al-
ienation from one another—their identity and their difference. such an imagination can 
moreover recognize the internal ‘complication’ of both terms of the opposition society-na-
ture that results from their mediation, when latour concerns himself with only one such 
complication—the internal multiplication of nature into an infinite number of singular 
actants—forgetting the parallel need to disaggregate the abstractions ‘man’ or ‘society’ 
today taken uncritically as the cause of the ecological crisis.26 to this extent the dialectical 
concept of mediation is precisely the opposite of the ‘purification’ latour takes it to be, and 
which he sees as modernism’s goal27; instead it tells us that nothing in subjects or objects 
is ever anything other than complex, contradictory and mutually interdependent. indeed 
one could fruitfully explore ways the dialectical notion of mediation takes account of the 
insights of latour’s ‘actor-network theory’—that the actions of individuals make no sense 
in abstraction from a milieu of things, objects and institutions in which they are always al-
ready involved and which are in turn transformed by them—whilst avoiding that theory’s 
weakness—its refusal to go beyond the appearance of acting ‘things’ to ask, as Marx did of 
the personified commodity or of the phenomenon of money, what alienated human prac-
tices might be concealed therein. latour’s antipathy to any attempted ‘reductio ad humanum’, 
to any ‘humanist’ privileging of one term of the ‘old constitution’, pays the high price of 
abandoning critique and remaining trapped at the level of social appearances.28
What it seems is timely to recall from the dialectical tradition is that the subject-object 
division cannot and should not simply be re-described out of existence: the separation of 
these terms is both real and illusory. contra latour, subject and object, concepts but also 
actual phenomena, in which are registered the interdependence but also diremption of 
humans and the nonhuman may be our best bet of gaining critical purchase on the de-
structive effects of that diremption, and creating a politics that might remedy it.
ModerNity aNd/or ecology?
latour is the first to acknowledge that he has no commitment to the project of 
philosophical modernity in which the foregoing philosophical debates took place, 
seeing that project rather as a ‘parenthesis’ which, when it didn’t misunderstand itself, 
Foster, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, New york, Monthly review press, 2000, p. 156.
     26. cf. Wilding, ‘ideas for a critical theory of Nature’.
     27. latour, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 66.
     28. When latour is not putting his faith in politicians, economists and moralists to implement his political 
ecology (pN 143-161) he is attacking those social sciences which claim to expose powers operating beneath 
society’s surface, a ‘dualism of primary and secondary qualities’ which he says mirrors that at work in the 
natural scientific view of nature. But the recognition by the dialectical tradition of the power and impera-
tives structuring capitalism was always in the far subtler language of a mutually mediating ‘essence’ and 
‘appearance’, concepts of which latour seems unaware. latour’s admittedly provocative statement that ‘like 
god, capitalism does not exist’ (The Pasteurization of  France, trans. a. sheridan and J. law, cambridge, har-
vard university press, 1988, p. 173) is at least consistent with this critique of primary qualities, but is no more 
politically astute for all that. Without a theory of capitalism, to take just one pertinent example, one will 
persist in the latourian belief that Kyoto changed everything when it has actually changed almost nothing.
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set out on false paths, paths from which we are now to free ourselves. yet a careful 
reconstruction of some of these exchanges shows that hasty rejection of philosophical 
modernity may itself be a mistake, and that the critical self-reflection of modernity 
we find particularly in hegel’s writings may anticipate many of the same concerns 
latour wishes addressed. From the above it is also possible to see ways hegel takes 
us further than can latourian thinking, revealing the cost of rejecting modernity 
and its philosophical ‘bicameralism’ in the inadvertent recreation of pre-critical, pre-
enlightenment worldviews, even when latour believes himself to have moved beyond 
modernity, or to have side-stepped history’s arrow altogether (pN 188-194). in latour’s 
holistic cosmos the unity, the indifference, recalls a time when bourgeois society had 
yet to separate us radically from nature, a time when, he is correct, nonhumans did 
not suffer from their lack of ‘subjectivity’. unfortunately, the price of legal equality was 
that these same nonhumans were routinely put on trial.29 if we balk at the prospect 
of recreating such a lex continui it is not solely because we recognize the naivety of the 
animist worldview. Nor is it solely because we see the dialectical irony that punishing 
nonrational, nonmoral animals is precisely to treat differently, indeed cruelly, what we 
hoped to treat equally and fairly. No, it is also because we realize that reinstituting some 
formal equality of human and nonhuman entities would do little to halt the destructive 
course of our capitalist societies. these societies, which persist today despite attempts to 
think oneself, Munchhausen-like, out of their constraints, seem—dialectically—bent on 
destroying the very nature which make them possible. resigned towards or incognizant 
of the determinants of this real separation and destruction, latourian philosophy tries 
to reunify the cosmos through mere bricolage, whilst modernity and the capitalism upon 
which it was built persist regardless. 
What latour calls ‘the gigantic gap between what the moderns say they are and 
what they have done and do’30 is not a reason to reject the project of modernity, a 
project whose greatest minds already recognized the high cost of nature’s subjuga-
tion, but a reason to reengage with the aporias into which modernity fell when its 
ideals were not matched by actuality, indeed when analysed actuality contradicted 
     29. Jean-luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order, trans. carol volk, university of chicago press, 1995, preface. 
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itself. at modernity’s origins, as capitalism spread from Britain to the continent, there 
developed a field of study, Naturphilosophie, which recognized the newfound separa-
tion of humanity from nature, both in thought and actuality, and puts its best efforts 
into a critical understanding of this development. rather than trying to create a 
tabula rasa from which modernity has been erased, as latour’s political ecology at-
tempts, we should reopen the debates launched within the modern tradition, specifi-
cally by the early german romantics, the Naturphilosophen and their critics (particu-
larly those concerning human subject and natural object) and deepen rather than 
disinvent them. the foregoing has suggested the productiveness of that very bête noir 
tradition of dialectics which latour abandons, a tradition which did justice to the 
complex interrelation of subject and object yet also showed how their difference is 
sedimented in a history whose reconciliation is not the work of philosophy alone, as 
hegel’s image of the owl of Minerva was to show. in this light a theory which posits a 
unified cosmos may amount to the mere ‘abstract, implicit truth’ hegel already criti-
cised. it will moreover find itself impotent in the face of actually existing diremptions, 
its expanded politics, its broader metaphysics undermined by—more than simply 
‘short-circuited’ by—an economy still speeding towards ecological self-destruct. this 
is to suggest that a more productive approach to nature than latour’s experimental 
metaphysics may be a critical theory which holds on to key insights of the dialectical 
tradition, insights which moreover would enable the very political ecology that in its 
latourian form is rendered powerless, directed as it is at the wrong target. latour 
says that ‘between modernity and ecology, we have to choose’.31 From the above it can 
be seen this is not necessarily the case, and that dwelling on philosophical modernity’s 
problematics, aporias and yes, ideals (just those hegel in his dispute with schelling 
was trying to tease out) may be the secret to achieving just that sophisticated ecologi-
cal politics latour calls for. 
Not that the dialectical tradition survives unscathed from all the criticisms to 
which it has been subjected in recent years, and to which latour aims to add the final 
nail in the coffin. in defending something of this tradition’s hope for human subject 
and natural object’s reconciliation against growing calls for their disinvention it must 
be admitted that this hope may prove belated, mere Minervan wisdom, if we have 
already entered an endgame where the offending environmental dynamic—ironically 
born at the same moment as Naturphilosophie—has moved beyond ‘tipping point’. if 
such an endgame means that the hegelian struggle for recognized freedom and for 
an end to both mastery and slavery reverts to a fight to the death, to a fight for mere 
animal survival, then indeed we would unfortunately have come full circle. But if the 
two battles are inseparable, and the former may still be the sine qua non of the latter, 
then hegel may still have a say, as avoiding not merely barbarism but extinction is 
seen as a choice which affects all subjects, and these subjects thereby recognize that 
the historical (hierarchical) form of their interaction, which reacts back destructively 
upon natural existence, is both unstable and unsustainable. that fear of the ‘abso-
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lute lord’ which hegel called ‘death’ might then be—in an admittedly grave but not 
hopeless scenario—the beginning of a wisdom which is not belated, which for once 
does not arrive after it can be put to good use. 
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